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COMPUTER CRIME AND THE
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE
ACT OF 1986t
FOREWORD
Since this Note was written, three people have been convicted
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.* The first was sentenced to
nine months in prison and fined $10,000, and the second pleaded guilty
without a trial.** The third, Robert Morris, was tried before a jury and
found guilty of violating the Act, but still awaits sentencing; he is the
first person to be convicted by jury under the Act.***
INTRODUCTION
Computer crime is one of the most intriguing and least understood
crimes. The scope of computer crime includes not only new computerspecific crimes, but a multitude of other older crimes as well. Because
of the constant change and advances in computer technology, computer
criminals will find new and innovative ways to commit existing crimes,
in addition to committing crimes that are, as of yet, undiscovered and/or
undefined. To meet this evolving class of crime, legislators have enacted several computer crime laws to confront computer felons. Their
efforts, however, have not, and will not, suffice to solve the problem of
computer crime.
This Note begins by providing a general background of computer
crime, including a definition of computer crime, descriptions of the type
of people involved with computer crime, the cost and pervasiveness of
computer crime, and the measures taken to prevent computer crime.
The next section addresses the provisions and shortcomings of the Comt This Note was awarded Third Place in the Sixth Annual Computer Law Writing
Competition (1989).
* See Markoff, Computer Intruder is Found Guilty, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1990, at
A21, col. 1.
** See Alexander, Prison Term for First U.S. Hacker-Law Convict, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 20, 1989, at 1; Markoff, supra note *.
*** See Markoff, supra note *; Student Guilty in Computer Break-in, Wash. Post,
Jan. 23, 1990, at A16, col. 1; Markoff, From Hacker to Symbol, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at
A19, col. 1; Burgess, Guilty Verdict may Slow Hill on "Virus" Bill, Wash. Post, Jan. 24,
1990, at All, col. 1; Kates, Changes Advocated in Computer Law, L.A. Daily J., Jan. 24,
1990, § I, at 26, col. 2.
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puter Fraud & Abuse Act of 1986 and offers some recommendations
that could resolve those shortcomings. In addition, problems which are
not generally related to computer crime statutes, but which, nevertheless, reduce their effectiveness, are also discussed. The last section suggests an alternative solution to combatting computer crime.
I.

BACKGROUND ON COMPUTER CRIME
A.

DEFINITION

The first and most basic difficulty with computer crime is the lack
of consensus as to what constitutes a computer crime.' Judges, lawyers,
legislators, and experts in the computer crime field, have struggled,
without success, to come up with a definition that adequately describes
computer crime. 2 There are several inherent problems with not having
a widely accepted and agreed upon definition of computer crime. First,
if we do not know what a computer crime is, how can we tell when one
has occurred?

Moreover, how can we develop effective and consistent
solutions to the computer crime problem if computer crime remains undefined? Finally, absent a consensus as to what constitutes computer

crime, studies on the subject will continue to produce inconsistent re3
sults and conclusions.
In attempting to define computer crime, some scholars have resorted to classifying the possible relationships that may exist between

computers and crime. For example, Donn Parker, in conjunction with
the Stanford Research Institute, listed four roles that computers can
1. Federal Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearing on HR. 3970 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1982) (statement of
Milton Wessel, Esq., Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpl, New York); see also Sokolik,
Computer Crime-The Need for DeterrentLegislation, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 353, 363 (1980);
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL 3 (1979) [hereinafter RESOURCE MANUAL]; D. PARKER, FIGHTING
COMPUTER CRIME 23 (1983).
2. The following definitions illustrate the difference in opinion as to what constitutes computer crime. RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 3 ("any illegal act for which
knowledge of computer technology is essential for successful prosecution"); A. BEQUAI,
COMPUTER CRIME 4 (1978) ("the use of a computer to perpetrate acts of deceit, concealment and guile that have as their objective the obtaining of property, money, services, and
political and business advantages"); Taber, A Survey of Computer Crime Studies, 2 CoMPUTER/L.J. 275, 298 (1980) (Taber defines a genuine computer crime as "a crime that, in
fact, occurred and in which a computer was directly and significantly instrumental").
3. However, the problem does not end with these inconsistent results and conclusions. Rather, it is compounded by the fact that legislation meant to deal with computer
crime is also based on these studies and, consequently, has proven to be ill-suited to properly deal with the problem. See generally Taber, supra note 2 (discussing the inconsistencies and flaws in several leading computer crime studies).
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play in a crime: object, subject, instrument, and symbol.4 Experts in the
field have also classified the methods used in committing computer
crimes. Most of these experts have recognized twelve commonly used
methods. 5 These methods have names that sound more like something
from a computer game than a computer crime. A few examples are: salami techniques, superzapping, logic bombs, piggybacking, 6 data diddling, and trap doors.
Many people who have written about computer crime have avoided
the problem of developing a definition by arguing that computer crime
is just traditional crime committed in new ways. 7 Although this may
generally be true for many computer crimes, some aspects of computer
crime are unique, making it very difficult to classify them using traditional crime definitions.8
B.

THE COMPUTER CRIMINAL

Most computer criminals are relatively young and very intelligent. 9
One study found that the typical computer criminal was between eight-

een and thirty years of age.' ° In addition, most of these computer
criminals, or "hackers,"'" have spent an inordinate amount of their time

playing with computers and have extraordinary skills and expertise in
4. D. PARKER, supra note 1, at 17; see also I. SLOAN, THE COMPUTER AND THE LAW 3
(1984).
5. See D. PARKER, supra note 1, at 75-100 (for a description and examples of the
twelve techniques used in computer crimes). See also RESOURCE MANUAL supra note 1, at
9-29; Reimer, Judicial and Legislative Responses to Computer Crimes, 53 INS. COUNS. J.
406, 407-09 (1986).
6. This technique has played a major role in drawing attention to the problem of
computer crime. "Piggybacking" is used to surreptitiously send computer "viruses"
through communication lines to infect other computer systems, sometimes causing enormous amounts of damage in lost data, computer time, and in the time and effort expended
in trying to combat these programs.
7. Reimer, supra note 5, at 406 (his definition summarizes this approach: "Computer
crimes are not new crimes, they are the same old crimes committed in fresh and inventive
ways made possible by the high technology of today's computers and telecommunications."). See also Ingraham, On Chtarging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 429, 438
(1980) ("Most computer-related crimes are, at their core, the same crimes that have been
prosecuted since the apple was plucked and Cain was banished.").
8. See Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Ciminalization:The Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 103 (1988) (citing D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 19 (1976)) (computers as "subjects" in computer crime presents new and unique
legal questions).
9. Sokolik, supra note 1, at 366. See D. PARKER, supra note 1, at 103-88.
10. Volgyes, The Investigation, Prosecution, and Prevention of Computer Crime: A
State-of-the-Art Review, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 385, 393 (1980).
11. A "hacker" is a term used to describe one who is preoccupied with computers.
Hackers spend the majority of their time trying to gain unauthorized access to networks
and computer systems, as well as engaging in other forms of computer abuse.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

the computer field. Consequently, many of them do not find their jobs
to be challenging and end up committing computer crimes at work to
avoid boredom.' 2 There is a notion that most computer felons do not
commit crimes for personal gain, but rather for the sake of a challenge.' 3 This, together with the fact that most computer criminals are
very young, makes it more difficult to view these people as criminals.
C.

COST & PERVASIVENESS

How much computer crime exists? How much does it cost the industry? Based, in part, on the lack of a consistent definition, studies
done on the pervasiveness and costs of computer crime have produced
inconsistent results.' 4 Annual losses due to computer crime have been
estimated at $2 million' 5 to $730 million,'6 with an average loss per incident ranging from $44,00017 to $10 million.' 8 Another study, done by
Stanford Research Institute (SRI), estimated the annual loss at $300
million with an average loss of $450,000 per incident.' 9 However, the
SRI study, like others, has serious flaws which have led to misleading
20
figures.
According to the 'tip of the iceberg' theory on computer crime detection and reporting, estimates of the costs of computer crime are
greatly distorted. 2 ' Specifically, the author of this theory hypothesizes
that the number of computer crimes detected represents only a fraction
of the ones actually committed because of the unique characteristics of
these crimes. In addition, many researchers believe that most computer
crimes go unreported because of fears held by the computer user or
12. Volgyes, supra note 10, at 393.
13. Sokolik, supra note 1, at 367-68.
14. See generally Taber, supra note 2.
15. Id.

(citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER-RELATED CRIMES IN FED-

ERAL PROGRAMS (1976)) (the actual figure arrived at ($2,151,413) represents losses from
computer-related crime in federal programs).

16. TASK FORCE ON COMPUTER CRIME, CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON COMPUTER CRIME 38 (1984) [hereinafter ABA REPORT]. Another commonly
quoted figure, especially in computer security advertisements, is an annual loss as high as
$3 billion. See, e.g., Absolute Security Inc. Advertisement, COMPUTERWORLD Focus: COMPUTER SECURITY, June 3, 1987, at 35 (the advertisement claims that "[t]he annual cost of
...computer crime to business is $3 billion").
17. Taber, supra note 2, at 282 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMPUTER-RELATED CRIMES IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1976)).
18. ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 38 (the survey states that reported losses fall "in

the range of $2 million to over $10 million").
19. Taber, supra note 2, at 288.
20. See generally id.
21. Sokolik, supra note 1, at 359.
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manufacturer. 22 Several studies have estimated that only 1% of all
computer crime is even detected.23 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(F.B.I.) estimates that, of those that are detected, only 14% are actually
reported. 2A F.B.I. statistics also estimate that only one in 22,000 computer criminals go to jail.25
D.

PREVENTION

Two basic approaches have been taken to fight computer crime: legislation and security. In the late 1970's, Florida 26 and Arizona 27 became
the first states to enact specific computer crime legislation. 2s In just
over ten years, the number of states that have enacted computer crime
statutes has grown to forty-eight. 29 On the federal level, Congress has
responded by enacting the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act in 198430 and amending it with the Computer
31
Fraud and Abuse Act in 1986.
Apart from specific computer crime legislation, several other statutes exist which may be used by law enforcement agencies to prosecute
computer crimes. There are forty federal statutes3 2 and eleven areas of
22. Id. Some of the fears noted are a loss in public confidence and possible liability
for lack of prevention and recovery losses. Id.
23. A. BEQuAI, supra note 2, at 4.
24. J. BECKER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE INVESTIGATION OF COMPUTER CRIME 6
(1980) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION]. See also T. SCHABECK, COMPUTER CRIME INVESTIGATION MANUAL 1, 4 (1979) (only 15% of computer crime is detected).
25. INVESTIGATION, supra note 24, at 6; see also Federal Computer Systems Protection
AcL' Hearing on H.R 3970 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1982) (statement of Milton Wessel, Esq., Parker, Chapin, Flattau &
Klimpl, New York) (about the FBI estimates: "One finds little source support for such
guesses").
26. FLA. STAT. § 815.02 (1983).
27. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301 (1983).
28. See generally Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681,
695-97, 710-12 (1980) (discussing Arizona and Florida legislation); see also M. ScoTT, COMPUTER LAW § 8.17 (1984).

29. Invasion of the Data Snatchers, TIME, Sept. 26, 1988, at 67.
30. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030
(West Supp. 1989)). See generally Tompkins & Mar, The 1984 Federal Computer Crime
Statute: A PartialAnswer to a PervasiveProblem, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 459 (1980) (discussing
the provisions and shortcomings of the statute).
31. Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213 (amending 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp.
1989)).
32. Federal Computer Systems Protection Act Hearing on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws & Proceduresof the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary,95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1978) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff); see also Nycum, The Criminal
Law Aspects of Computer Abuse: Part II - Federal Criminal Code, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPuTERs & L. 297, 305-22 (1976) (documenting the forty existing federal statutes under Title 18 of the United States Code that can be used on computer-related crimes). See
generally Coolley, RICO: Modern Weaponry Against Software Pirates,2 COMPUTER/L.J.
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traditional state law3 3 that can be used to attack computer crime. The
areas of state law include: arson, burglary, embezzlement, larceny,
criminal mischief, extortion, forgery, theft, receipt of stolen property,
theft of services or labor under false pretenses, and theft of trade
secrets.34 Although this alternative legislation can be used to prosecute
computer crimes, it is often difficult to apply traditional laws developed
3
before the computer age, to computer crimes. 5
The other commonly used method of fighting computer crime is security.36 The number of companies offering and specializing in computer security has increased dramatically over the past few years.
Accompanying this explosion in the security industry has been an expansion in the different types of security offered. A few of the security
measures presently available include: retinal patterns, fingerprints, encryption, special keys, and, of course, passwords.3 7 Despite a heightened
awareness of the need for computer security, many believe that security
measures continue to fall short of what is required.-3 One factor which
may account for this is the cost involved in providing these security
measures.3 9 This cost will play an increasing role in the user's security
decisions as computer crime and the costs of computer security continue
to rise.

II. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
A.

PROVISIONS

On October 12, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (the
143 (1980) (discussing the applicability of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) to combat software pirating).
33. Starkman, Computer Crime: The Federal vs. State Approach to Solving the Problem, 65 MICH. B.J. 314, 316 (1986).
34. See A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 25-35; Reimer, supra note 5, at 407-09 (explaining
different computer crime techniques and how they can be prosecuted under existing areas
of state law).
35. See generally Becker, The Trial of a Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 441
(1980) (noting some of the problems of trying to apply traditional criminal statutes to
computer-related crimes); see also Volgyes, supra note 10, at 395-96; Starkman, supra note
33, at 315 (using case analysis of United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978) to
demonstrate inherent problems with attempting to apply traditional criminal statutes to
computer crime).
36. See generally Sokolik, supra note 1, at 368-71 (discussing the use of computer security as a method of crime deterrence).
37. See generally Tucker, Security in the FirstDegree, COMPUTERWORLD Focus: COMPUTER SECURITY, June 3, 1987, at 17-19 (discussing existing and new techniques used in
computer security).
38. See Sokolik, supra note 1, at 371.
39. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 37, at 19 (one security system which uses the pattern
of blood vessels in the individual's retina costs between $6,000 and $7,000).
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"1984 Act") as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 40
This statute became the first piece of legislation specifically targeted at
deterring and punishing computer crimes at the federal level. The 1984
Act was amended with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (the
"1986 Amendment"). 41 The 1986 Amendment extended the scope of the
1984 Act and clarified some of the ambiguities in the original piece of
legislation. The 1984 Act, as extended by the 1986 Amendment, will be
referred to as the "Act."
The Act prohibits six types of computer abuse and provides for
three types of felonies. The first section of the Act makes it a felony to
knowingly access a computer: (i) without authorization or in excess of
authorized access, and (ii) obtain information related to national defense, foreign relations, or restricted by Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (iii) with an intent or reason to believe that it will be
used to harm the United States or to help a foreign nation.42 This crime
43
is punishable by fine, ten years in jail, or both, for the first offense,
and imprisonment for up to twenty years for repeat offenders. 44 Subsection 4, added by the 1986 amendment, makes it a felony to knowingly
and with intent to defraud, access a federal interest computer and obtain anything of value.45 Mere use of a computer is not included.46 This
crime is punishable by fine, imprisonment for five years, or both, for
first time offenders, 47 and imprisonment for ten years for repeat offenders. 48 Subsection 5, also added by the 1986 amendment, makes it a felony to alter, damage, and destroy information in any federal interest
computer if losses surpass $1000, during a one-year period, or if such action interferes with any medical care of one or more individuals. 49 This
crime carries with it the same penalties as those outlined in subsection
4.50

There are three misdemeanors included in the Act. Subsection 2 of
the Act prohibits unauthorized access to obtain information contained
in a financial record of a financial institution.5 ' A violation of this sub40. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. III 1985).
41. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213
(1986) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. III 1985)).
42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989); see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42
U.S.C.A. § 201 4 (y) (West 1973).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
44. Id. § 1030(c)(1)(B).
45. 1& § 1030(a)(4).
46. Id
47. Id § 1030(c)(3)(A).
48. 1L § 1030(c)(3)(B).
49. I& § 1030(a)(5).
50. Id. § 1030(c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(B).
51. Id § 1030(a)(2).
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section is punishable by a one-year sentence, a fine, or both,52 and a tenyear sentence for repeat offenders. 53 Subsection 3 of the Act prohibits
access to any computer that is exclusively for government use. If the
computer is only partially used by the government, then subsection 3
prohibits access when such conduct affects the government's use of such
computer5 4 The penalties for violating subsection 3 are the same as
those for violating subsection 2.55 Subsection 6 makes it a misdemeanor
to traffic passwords or similar access information if it affects interstate
or foreign commerce or if the computer is used by the government of
the United States. 56 The penalties for violating subsection 6 also follow
57
the penalties under subsection 2.
The specific fine provisions in the 1984 Act were repealed by the
fine provisions of the Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984.58 In addition, the Act includes several definitions that the 1984 Act did not include. For instance, the terms "financial record, '59 "exceeds authorized
access," 60 "financial institution," 61 "federal interest computer, '62 and
"computer" 63 (which was also defined by the 1984 Act) are defined.
The United States Secret Service is charged with primary authority to
investigate offenses under the Act. 64 The Act also allows any other
agency, that might have authority, to participate, although it does not
specify which agencies have the authority. 65 The Act also makes it a
66
crime to attempt to commit any offense under the Act.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

i& § 1030(c)(2)(A).
Id,§ 1030(c)(2)(B).
I& § 1030(a)(3).
1d § 1030(c)(2)(A),(c)(2)(B).
Id. § 1030(a)(6).
Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B).

58.

Note, Computer Crime, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 429, 434 (1987); see also Criminal

Fine Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-596, 98 Stat. 3134 (1984) (current version codified at
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1989)). The Criminal Fine Enforcement Act
provides for maximum fines ranging from $5,000 to $250,000. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3571(b) (West
Supp. 1989).
59.

18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(5) (West Supp. 1989).

60. Id. § 1030(e)(6).

61. Id. § 1030(e)(4).
62. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
63. Id § 1030(e)(1). A computer is defined as "an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or
storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility di-

rectly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other
similar device." Id,
64. Id, § 1030(d).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 1030(b).
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B.

PROBLEMS WiTH THE

ACT

At the time this article was written, in November, 1988, the Act
had been in existence for over four years, but had been used successfully in the conviction of only a handful of computer criminals. 67 There
are two possible explanations for why the Act has been so ineffective in
punishing computer criminals. First, the scope of the provisions of the
Act, as well as the language of the Act, make it difficult to obtain a conviction. Second, apart from the Act, computer crime and computer
crime laws in general, make it difficult to prosecute under the Act.
1.

Language of the Act

Congress has done a good job trying to correct a number of the
shortcomings in the 1984 Act. However, a few problems with the Act
still remain. The first problem involves the scope of the Act. Specifically, the Act focuses primarily on computers used and owned by governmental departments. Yet, computers used and owned by corporate
America are arguably subject to the most abuse; yet they are virtually
ignored.
Subsections 2 and 6 may be applicable to privately owned business
computers, as subsection 2 prohibits access to computers that contain financial records or belong to a financial institution. 68 However, access is
not a crime unless information is obtained.6 9 The word "obtained" is
not defined in the Act. Consequently, the question remains as to
whether simply looking at the information is enough or whether the in70
formation has to be downloaded to a hard copy.
Subsection 6 prohibits the trafficking of passwords. 71 This, however, is a crime only if it affects interstate commerce. 72 It is unclear exactly what is meant by "affects interstate commerce." Uncertainty
about those and other terms may cause prosecutors to steer clear of the
Act and, instead, pursue convictions under state laws or other federal
statutes.
Another area of computer abuse that is not prohibited by the Act is
simple "computer trespass" or browsing, where one breaks into a computer and simply views files or data without actually causing any
"harm." For example, if a person breaks into the Pentagon computers
67. As of January 1987, there had been no convictions under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. Note, supra note 58, at 435 n.46 (statement of Milton Wessel, Professor of
Computer Law, Columbia University, Jan. 8, 1987).
68. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
69. Id.
70. A "hard copy" is usually a computer printout of data or information stored in a
computer's memory.

71. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(6) (West Supp. 1989).
72. Id.
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and just views top secret information, it is not a crime. In order to violate the Act in this case, the person would have to obtain the information with the intent or reason to believe that the information will be
used to harm the United States. 73 Under subsection 2, it is not a crime
to view financial records as long as no information is obtained.74 Furthermore, subsection 4 contains an explicit use exception. 75 It allows a
person to access a federal interest computer without authorization as
long as "the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of
'76
the use of the computer.
The real danger in allowing this type of computer abuse is that it
represents the first step in the commission of computer crime.
Although no immediate harm results from computer trespass, if al77
lowed, it will pave the path for future and more severe abuse.
In addition, it would help to clarify the meaning of the statute if
terms such as "affect interstate or foreign commerce," "affects the use
of the Government's operation," "obtain information," "unauthorized
access," and "intentionally access" were defined. Under subsection 3,
presumably any access will have at least a minimal affect on the government's use of the computer. 78 How much does one have to "affect
interstate commerce" to trigger penalties under subsection 6? 7 9 Under
subsections 1 and 2, if "obtain information" is construed loosely it could
encompass merely looking at unauthorized data.8 0 This interpretation
would extend the scope of the Act to include simple computer trespass.
Is "unauthorized access" meant to include only unauthorized direct access or does it include unauthorized indirect access?8 1 Furthermore, a
literal interpretation of subsection 5 would suggest that if a person unintentionally accesses a computer and then purposely causes over $1000
73. See id. § 1030(a)(1).
74. Id § 1030(a)(2).
75. Id § 1030(a)(4).
76. Id (emphasis added).
77. The typical scenario goes something like this: The hacker starts off with a simple
challenge such as computer trespass. If this action goes unpunished he will assume that
this type of behavior is acceptable. Naturally, as soon as this task is mastered, he will
seek a greater challenge, such as altering and destroying data, to satisfy his curiosity and
accomplishment. However, if computer abuse is punished at the bottom level-i.e., computer trespass--hackers will be dissuaded from going on to the next and more harmful
levels of computer abuse.
78. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
79. See Id § 1030(a)(6).
80. See Id § 1030(a)(1), (a)(2).
81. Unauthorized direct access is where one accesses a computer system absent authorized access at that level. Unauthorized indirect access is where a person has authorized access at the initial level, but then goes on to access another level of the computer
system without authorization.
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in damage, there would be no penalty.8 2 These are but a few examples
of the problems generated by the lack of sufficiently clear definitions in
the Act.
One last subsection in need of clarification is subsection d which
gives the United States Secret Service, "in addition to any other
agency," the authority to investigate offenses under the Act.83 Logically, any other agency would probably mean, among others, the F.B.I.
If the Act were to specifically give jurisdiction in such cases, there
would be no question as to which agency is responsible for pursuing violations of the Act.84
Some of these loopholes in the Act have recently come under scrutiny in light of the damage caused by a computer virus set loose by Cornell University graduate student, Robert Morris. 8 5 In early November
8 7
6
1988, Morris created a computer viruss that took advantage of a bug
8
8
in a program called Sendmail. The virus was sent through the Internet network, a network that links over 60,000 computers at national
laboratories, universities, and military installations.8 9 It quickly spread
across the country and caused many computers to shut down. 9° Luckily, the program did not destroy any data.9 1
Two possible. subsections under the Act could be used to prosecute
Morris, subsections 3 and 5.92 Under both of the subsections, the perpe82. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
83. Id. § 1030(d).
84. In the recent computer virus incident involving Robert Morris, the F.B.I. handled
the investigation.
85. For a comprehensive description of the developments leading up to the discovery
of the computer virus and its aftermath see Wash. Post, Nov. 4-11, 1988, and COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 7 & Nov. 14 (1988); Alexander, FBI Expected to Throw Book at Virus
Suspect, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 2, 1989, at 2; Alexander, Morris Indicted in Internet Virus Affair, COMPUTERWORLD, July 31, 1989, at 8; Alexander, Not So Fast Please, CoMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 7, 1989, at 37.

86. A "computer virus" is a program which is created for the sole purpose of multiplying and spreading itself to other computers through networking systems that link
thousands of computer systems. Sometimes these programs simply multiply and take up
space in a computer's memory. Some, unfortunately, actually destroy data in the process.
Most viruses are attached to a legitimate program by "piggybacking." See supra note 6.
87. A "bug" is a defect in a computer program which can cause the program to operate in a way that it was not intended to. It may be years, however, before the right set of
circumstances arise to trigger the bug.
88. Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1988, at A10, col. 1.
89. Id.
90. See Alexander, Virus Ravages Thousands of Systems, CoMPuTERwoRLD, Nov. 7,
1988, at 1; Doherty, Virus Hits Arpanet, ELEC. ENG'G TIMES, Nov. 7, 1988, at 1; Wash. Post,
Nov. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
91. Betts, Virus' "Benign" Nature Will Make it Difficult to Prosecute, CoMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 14, 1988, at 16.
92. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(3), (a)(5) (West Supp. 1989). For a discussion of the ap-
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trator must access the computer system intentionally and without authorization. 93 The problem with the Act in relation to this and other
computer viruses is that Morris had authorized access at the initial level
(the Cornell University computer system). 94 The virus then reproduced
itself and spread to other computer systems. Furthermore, friends of
Morris claim that he did not intend for the virus to spread so widely nor
inflict the damage that ultimately resulted.95 He claims his intent was
to make known a bug in the Sendmail program. 96 Under subsection 5,
even if the prosecution proves the intent and unauthorized access, they
must prove that the action altered, damaged, or destroyed information.97 Despite all the problems that resulted, it appears that no such
thing happened. 98
2. Problems Unrelated to the Act
The lack of prosecutions under the Act could also be attributed to
factors unrelated to the Act. First, the victims of computer crimes are
reluctant to report them because the reporting of a computer crime is
an admission that the computer system is vulnerable. 99 Victims may
fear that the bad publicity will mean a decrease in the confidence level
among their clients. Moreover, a simple cost/benefit analysis might
convince the victim that the loss in business would not be worth the
time and money spent in pursuing the prosecution of the crime.'0 0
Another factor which deters victims from reporting computer
crimes is their lack of confidence in the system's ability to successfully
prosecute the offender. Unfortunately, this concern is not totally unfounded. First, there is a lack of precedent in the computer crime
field. 0°1 From 1978 to 1986, less than 200 computer related prosecutions
were initiated on the national level.' 0 2 Therefore, many of the cases being brought are ones of first impression, involving an initial interpretion
of a particular computer crime statute. Second, many prosecutors and
judges lack the computer knowledge to properly handle computer crime
plication of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Robert Morris' actions see Betts, supra
note 91.
93. Id.
94. Wash. Post, Nov. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
95. Alexander, Security, Ethics Under National Scrutiny, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 14,
1988, at 6; see also Betts, supra note 91.
96. Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1988, at A8, col. 1.
97. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
98. Betts, supra note 91, at 16.
99. Sokolik, supra note 1, at 359; See also Stephen, Law Against Computer Criminals
Strengthened, PC WEEK, Nov. 25, 1986, at 107.
100. Note, supra note 58, at 435.
101. Stephen, supra note 99, at 107.
102. Hollinger, supra note 8, at 117.
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cases. Since computer technology is fairly new and constantly evolving,
it is very difficult for those who did not grow up with computers to acquire the proper knowledge. We will probably have to wait until a majority of lawyers and judges are familiar and comfortable with computer
technology before we see computer crimes properly interpreted and
applied.
This lack of computer familiarity leads to many problems, including
the problem of how to properly issue search warrants.10 3 Lawyers have
difficulty in describing exactly what is to be searched. 1° 4 Many times,
the thing to be searched does not even exist in physical form but only as
bits 10 5 in the computer's memory banks. The form in which information is stored in a computer also causes trouble for the judge. If the
judge issues a search warrant to search the computer files, how can this
be done without improperly violating privacy rights?' ° 6 In computer
crime cases, judges and lawyers must rely on the expertise of computer
experts to help them make decisions at the very start of the criminal
proceedings. It is easy to see how the investigation of a simple computer crime could turn sour at its earliest stages.
Once the evidence is obtained, prosecutors face yet another obstacle: the hearsay rule. 10 7 Computer printouts are usually very crucial to
the making of a case, but they are considered hearsay. l0 8 To get around
this rule, prosecutors have tried to admit such evidence as business
records. 10 9 However, this still causes problems because the evidence
must have been prepared during the regular course of business in order
to fall within this exception. 110 If this course fails, prosecutors may try
to admit the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) which allows evidence to be admitted that is material and "is more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other piece of evidence"
available."'
103. See generally Becker, supra note 35, at 411.
104. Id at 443.
105. A "bit" is a subunit of a byte which is a measurement of memory in a computer.
A bit can take on the value of "1" or "0." One character is represented in the computer's
memory as a succession of these bits, i.e., "10011101."
106. Becker, supra note 35, at 411. For instance, if the judge issues a search warrant
for a particular computer, everything in the entire computer might be searched in order
to find the relevant evidence.
107. See FED. R. EvID. 801-806. See also Note, supra note 53, at 437-438.
108. Note, supra note 53, at 437.
109. Id See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
110. Note, supra note 53, at 437. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) ("A... record... if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the . . . record [will not be excluded by the hearsay
rule] ... ").
111.

Note, supra note 58, at 437. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
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III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION TO COMPUTER CRIME:
EDUCATION
Although Congress has passed the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
and forty-eight states have enacted specific computer crime legislation,
the problem of computer crime still exists. There have been very few
112
prosecutions nationwide under any of the computer crime statutes.
The proper and more effective solution to computer crime is increased
education on four levels. First, and most important, there needs to be
more education on computer abuse in the elementary schools all the
way up through the universities. Second, users of computer systems
need to be educated, and a code of ethics that will foster self-regulation
needs to be developed and implemented. Third, the legal communitylawyers, judges, and law enforcement personnel-must be educated on
the intricacies of computers and computer crime. Finally, the public
must be educated.
The first priority is education in the schools and universities. This
is the most important and effective level at which computer crime can
be stopped. Children who learn early what is not allowed will carry
that knowledge with them to college and eventually into the work
force. At least one school district-the Red Bank (New Jersey) school
district-has introduced "computer responsibility training."113 Although this is a step in the right direction, the positive effects of such
training will not be fully realized until educators across the entire
United States implement such programs.
Institutions of higher learning have been notoriously lenient on
computer abusers and, in some cases, have even encouraged such
abuse. 11 4 Many computer science instructors view hacking as a constructive way of learning and developing computer expertise."15 In response to the Robert Morris incident, Howard McCausland, a computer
science professor at Harvard, said: "I realize he's done us all something
of a service by calling our attention to a hole. '11 6 A specific example of
a university condoning computer abuse occurred when California Institute of Technology students reportedly received course credit for taking
control of a computerized scoreboard during the 1984 Rose Bowl
game. 117 Although this example appears harmless, if let go, it could
lead to worse computer abuse.
112. See supra text accompanying note 102.
113. Weintraub, Teaching Computer Ethics in the Schools, THE SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR 8, 9 (Apr. 1986).

114. Hollinger, supra note 8, at 113.
115. Id.
116. Ryan & Margolis, Verdict Awaits Monger: Hero or Hacker?, COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov. 14, 1988, at 8.
117. Hollinger, supra note 8, at 113.
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Leading computer science universities, such as Carnegie Mellon,
MIT, and Stanford, should take the initiative by requiring a computer
ethics course as part of their computer science curricula. Furthermore,
a student code of computer ethics should be implemented and enforced
within the major universities. If these steps are taken, it would ensure
that students recognize the seriousness of computer abuse and would
decrease the probability that those students would engage in computer
abuse in t1e future. 1 8
The next area to address is the education of those individuals in the
legal field. Very few law schools have courses specifically devoted to
computer crime or computer law even though the field of computer law
is probably the most rapidly expanding area of the law today and is expected to continue to grow in the future."19 As previously mentioned,
lack of computer literacy among lawyers and judges often prevents effective prosecution of computer criminals.120 If more lawyers and
judges became familiar with computers, the legal system would be better prepared to handle computer crime cases. This, in turn, would increase the public's confidence in the system and encourage victims to
come forward with accounts of computer crime.
Education of computer users, such as businesses, corporations, and
the government, should begin with the development of a code of ethics.
Computer organizations should work with users to develop a code that
would be uniformly acceptable. One such organization, the Data
Processing Management Association (DPMA), has already developed a
model computer crime code. This code, or one similar to it, could be introduced to new employees as part of their training program and discussed in any of the several computer conferences held each year.
At present, there is a wide range of attitudes towards computer
crime. Many companies even hire the people who have broken into
their systems as security consultants. 121 In response to the recent computer virus ordeal, many have even praised Morris' actions as instructive. Computerworld asked individuals at seven companies whether
they would hire Robert Morris, two responded that they would.1 22 Un118. The current attitude about computer abuse in universities is not very promising.
A survey of 200 students at a major university indicated that 22% of the students would,
definitely or probably, examine or modify confidential information, while only 3% would
definitely not. Hollinger, supra note 8, at 113.
119. At least two of the leading law schools, Georgetown and Columbia, offer courses
in computer law.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
121. Sokolik, supra note 1, at 372.
122. To Hire or Not To Hire, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 14, 1988, at 8. There has been
even more praise of Robert Morris' computer virus by the business community. Peter
Neumann, a computer security expert at SRI International, thought that Morris had
"done us a great service" and added that he believes Morris will be seen as a folk hero.
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til businesses develop a code of ethics which reflects their disapproval of
computer crime, computer criminals will continue to perpetrate crimes
with their tacit stamp of approval.
A final group which needs to be educated about computer crime is
the public. It is very easy for the average person to recognize that murder is wrong. However, because computer crime is often viewed as a
"victimless" crime, the average person has difficulty grasping the seriousness of the offense. In this respect, the media will play a major role
in educating the public. This will require a departure from the media's
past treatment of computer criminals as folk heroes, exemplified by the
now famous "414" Gang. 123 One writer has outlined a two pronged role
that the media must play in changing the public's attitude towards computer crime. 124 First, the media must convey a sense of the frequency
of computer crime, and second, it must convey a sense that computer
crime is a threat to society. 125 The media's coverage of the latest computer virus case successfully conveyed the scope and severity of the
computer abuse. If the media continues this type of coverage, the public
will take a more serious stance on computer crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there are several references in this Note to the "solution
for computer crime," very few crimes, including computer crime, can be
totally eliminated. However, methods do exist to help curb the alarming rate of computer crime. Specifically, if businesses, the government,
the legal system, and educators, couple education with the existing
crime statutes, computer crime may be brought under control.
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